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INTERSTATE COMMERCE-ORIGINAL PACKAGES OF CIGARETTES.
-Awtin v. State of Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343 (1900). The defend-
ant was convicted under a Tennessee statute, which provided that
no person should sell, or bring into the state for the purpose of sell-
ing, any cigarettes. He had ordered a consignment of cigarettes
from a manufacturer in North Carolina. They were packed in
pasteboard boxes 3x1 inches in size, each box containing ten cigar-
ettes, and without any shipping address. For safety and convenience
in transportation, these boxes or packages were carried in large, open
baskets owned by the express company, and emptied on the counter
at defendant's place of business. For the sale of a package, defend-
ant was convicted.
NOTES.
The main question in the case was whether or not the defendant
had sold an original package. The majority of the court, on grounds of
public policy and to prevent a fraudulent evasion of statutes, defined
an original package to be one of the size generally used in bonafide
interstate transactions, and not the one in which the importation is
actually made. "The whole theory of the exemption of the original
package from the operation of state laws is based upon the idea that
the property is imported in the ordinary form in which, from time
immemorial, foreign goods have been brought into the country."
But taking the words "original package" in their literal sense,
manufacturers, by shipping in minute packages that go at once to
retail dealers and consumers, evade the prohibitory laws of the states.
If the original package is that imported separately and loosely, then
beer would be exempt from state laws, whether shipped in hogsheads
or vials; cigarettes sent in an importer's case or singly; "anything
from a bale of merchandise to a single ribbon, provided only the
dealer sees fit to purchase his stock outside the state and import it in
minute quantities." Therefore the original package, if any there be
in this case, is the basket and not the paper box.
This conclusion was vigorously dissented from by four judges. It
being conceded;that Congress has exclusive control over interstate
commerce, and that no state under its police power can directly
restrain such commerce, how can the size of the package or the
manner of importation determine the limit of national control? How
can a state prevent the importation and sale of a pint of whisky and
not that of a barrel? The state either has the power to prohibt,
whatever the size of the package, or it has no power, and the matter
is to be left solely to Congress. If Congress has not prescribed the
package in whioh the importation and sale are to be made, the
importer can fix it to suit himself.
The law of original packages began with Brown v. Maryland, 12
Wheat. 419 (1827), in which a statute of Maryland, requiring all
importers of foreign articles "by bale or package" or of intoxicating
liquors "by hogshead, barrel or tierce" to pay a license, was held
unconstitutional. Marshall conceded that the state could tax when
the importer had so acted upon the thing imported that it had lost
its distinctive character as an export, "but while remaining the
property of the importer in his warehouse, in the original form or
package in which it was imported, a tax upon it is too plainly a duty
on imports to escape the prohibition of the constitution." This
decision applied to foreign imports only. In Woodru.g v. Parham,
8 Wall, 123 (1868), a statute of Alabama, authorizing a tax on sales
at auction, was held applicable to goods of another state, though sold
in the original and unbroken package. In Brown v. Houston, 114
U. S. 622 (1884), the court said, "With the exception of goods im-
ported from foreign countries, still in the original packages, and
goods in transit to some other place, why may not he (the assessor)
assess all property alike that may be found in the city, being there
for the purpose of remaining there until used or sold, and constitut-
ing part of the great mass of commercial capital-provided, always.
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that the assessment be a general one." This distinction between
foreign and state imports was later abolished. In Leisy v. Hardin,
135 U. S. 100 (1889), it was held that a state could not prohibit
the importation and sale, from abroad or from a sister state, of
intoxicating liquors, and that they did not become a part of the
common mass of property within the state so long as they remained
in the casks in which they were imported. In the case of Schollen-
berger v. Pa., 171 U. S. 1 (1897), the statute had no force to pre-
vent a sale of oleomargarine imported and sold in packages of ten
pounds weight; such package being of the form, size and weight
customarily adopted by importers, and there being no evidence of
a design to evade the statute.
Much reliance was placed by the court on the case of May v. New
Orleans, 178 U. S. 496 (1899). There the goods were put up and
sold in packages, a large number of them being inclosed in wooden
cases for transportation. Upon arrival at New Orleans the pack-
ages were taken out and sold unbroken. The original package was
held to be not the package, but the wooden case, and the sale was
taxable. Unless an open basket owned by the express company can
be classed as an inclosed case, there is a reasonable distinction
between the facts of the two cases. The open basket is in the same
category as the express car and express wagon. The three are
simply a convenient means of shipping the cigarette packages
singly. It is admitted that there must be some kind of an original
package, and it seems equally true that it must be inclosed. Where,
then, was the original package if the cigarette package cannot be
considered so'? The majority court says, if there is any, it is the
open basket. The surest ground of the decision is to regard the
defendant's method as a trick and evasion of the statute.
Several Pennsylvania cases were cited to support the majority
view, but, on examination, it appears that the goods were shipped in
boxes or barrels inclosed, and sold in small quantities. See Comm.
v. Zelt, 138 Pa. 615-639 (1890); Comm. v. Paul, 170 Pa. 284
(1895); in this last case, however, a small tub of oleomargarine,
containing ten pounds, in which the importation was made, was held
to be not an original package. In Iowa, McGregor v. Cone, 104
Iowa, 465 (1898), packages of cigarettes of the same size as those
involved in the case under consideration were imported in closed
pine boxes. A sale of a package was held to be within the statute.
Importations of cigarette packages, containing ten cigarettes,
have been made, each package separate and loose from the other,
and without any other wrapping, and the importation and sale have
been declared not subject to prohibitory state legislation: In re
Mfinor, 69 Fed. 233 (1895.) A strong decision on this point is
Guckenheimer v. Selers, 81 Fed. 998 (1897).
CIvIL LAw.-Parallels to Peuker v. Canter, 63 Pac. 617. (See
AmERIcAN LAW REGISTER, April, 1901, p. 238.) Perhaps your
readers may have noticed the close Roman parallels to the "novel
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and interesting circumstances" which you report (April, 1901, p.
238) in the Kansas case of Peuker v. Canter.
The full report of a Roman case in alluvion decided by A.fenus
Varus (First Century B. C.) may be found in Justinian's "Digest,"
lib. 41, title 1, fragm. 38. The circumstances were as follows:
Attius was (1) separated from the river by a public highway and by
land (not his) lying between the highway and the river, i. e., had no
riparian rights; (2) the river erodes the land up to and finally
across the public highway (at this point Alfenus held that the
new land formed on the farther side of the river has acceded by
alluvion to the [non-submerged] land touching the river on that
side); (3) then the river gradually receded until it regained its
original position. Alfenus held that the alluvial increase now goes
by accession to Attius.
This decision conformed to the Roman strict law rules: (1) that
the actual bed of the river is state property, and incapable of private
ownership; (2) that alluvium accedes to contiguous (i. e., non-sub-merged) land, as accessory thing to principal thing; and, (3) that
the course of nature having consumed all the original principal land
upon one side, the land behind that has become the principal thing.
(That the erosion must be strictly alluvial is shown by the statement
of Pomp onius [Dig. 41, 1,30, 3], that eodea 4mpetufluminis resti-
Iuts [ager] goes to the original owner of the overflowed land. This
view is affirmed by Gaius [Dig. 41, 1, 7, 6].)
I use above the qualifying term "striet law," for some considerable
opposition to the full legal consequences of the third rule is shown
in a text-book statement of Gaius (Dig. 41, 1, 7, 5). In the case
there contemplated, the river also, in abandoning its original bed,
completely consumes A.'s land and with its bed occupies the spacepreviously held by that land. (It will be understood that I am
speaking from the civilian standpoint.) Later it also returns to its
original bed. Gains says that "stricta 'atione" A. would lose alltitle (i. e., in strict law Alfenus would be right) ; but Gais adds
the significant words "vix est ut id obtineat" (" this would hardly
obtain"). Unfortunately Gains pursues this line no further, and
we are left to inference as to whether he contemplated an iquitable
recovery by A. of the whole, or of a portion, which latter seems, from
your report, to be decided, in the cae of Peuker v. banter, by the
Supreme Court of Kansas (leaving to the lower court to determine
what the equitable proportion should he).
Edgar S. Shumway.
